African American Muslims in prison Essay Example for Free

African American Muslims in prison Essay Most African-American Muslims look to mainstream orthodox Muslim organizations such as the Muslim Society of America (Christian Science Monitor, February 14, 2002). This includes believers once affiliated with NOI who eventually parted ways with the group due to its emphasis on Black identity.   In order to assess the potential threat of radicalism in the African-American Muslim community, it is important to distinguish between the myriad of ideologies that influence the outlook of Black Muslims today from the groups and individuals on the extreme fringe implicated in terrorism. This holds especially true when one considers social protest movements that fought for racial equality during the U.S. civil rights struggle that continue to wield influence today, such as the Nation of Islam (NOI). Founded in 1933, in its early years NOI encompassed a mix of Islamic discourse and a worldview that held that Blacks were Gods chosen people. Whites were seen as inferior, oppressors and regularly referred to as devils, in what many observers contend was a reaction to the ideals of white supremacy that prevailed in society [3]. NOI borrowed heavily from the beliefs held by the Moorish Science Temple. Founded in 1913 by Timothy Drew, later known as Noble Drew Ali, the Moorish Science Temple of America (MSTA), as it is referred to today, is regarded as the first major Black identity movement. Islam, Judaism, Christianity and other belief systems shaped MSTA’s worldview. MSTA declared that African-Americans are the descendants of the ancient Moorish Muslim civilization whose culture had been suppressed by the legacy of slavery.   NOI helped inspire the radical Black Power movement of the 1960s that broke with the non-violent approach of activists such as Martin Luther King, Jr., including the Black Panther Party for Self Defense, later known as the Black Panther Party (BPP). BPP did not rely on religious discourse and instead emphasized popular revolutionary struggle in the name of social justice and Black liberation. NOI also influenced Black identity movements across the English-speaking Caribbean, Canada and Great Britain. In many respects, the agendas of NOI and BPP converged in a number of areas. The Nation of Gods and Earths, also known as the Five Percent Nation of Islam or simply as the Five Percenters (FP), represents another side of the Black identity movement that mixes aspects of Islam, Judaism, Christianity and other beliefs (http://www.allahsnation.net). FP, which split from NOI in 1964, is adamant that it is not a religion, but maintains that Islam represents a way of life. Its worldview declares Blacks as the original people of the earth and the founders of civilization. FP sees Black men as Gods, which they refer to as ALLAH (Arm, Leg, Leg, Arm and Head), not to be mistaken with the Arabic word for God. FP ideology also espouses the theory of Supreme Mathematics, which among other things maintains that followers represent the chosen five percent of mankind who lead a virtuous life. FP enjoys a large following among popular Hip Hop artists and African-American activists [4]. It also has a following in the U.S. prison system, where some members have been linked with gang activity and violence [5]. FP made headlines when false allegations surfaced linking convicted Washington DC-area snipers John Allen Muhammed and John Malvo to the group. Muhammed was actually a former member of NOI, but had left the group years before the attacks.   Orthodox Sunni Muslim organizations regard MSTA, NOI and FP as heretical cults. Indias Ansar us-Sunnah Library and Research Center refers to NOI as the Nation of Kufr (unbelievers) for its emphasis on Black nationalism and identity and what it describes as a blend of false Muslim and Christian beliefs. The groups website places NOI alongside Shiites, which they describe as rafidah (rejectors), and other groups they consider heretics such as Sufis, Druze and Amhadis in a section warning Muslims to guard their faith (http://www.allaahuakbar.net). The NOI continues to grapple with the dilemma of reconciling its origins as a Black identity group with orthodox Islam. This has led to major rifts and splits within the movement over the years. Despite the influence of NOI under the charismatic leadership of Louis Farrakhan, the vast majority of Black Muslims today subscribe to orthodox Islam, a trend that has been growing over the years. Homegrown Terrorism The highly publicized Seas of David case was not the first of its kind. The case of the obscure Jamaat al-Fuqra (Community of the Impoverished, JF), a Muslim association with branches in South Asia and North America, once raised concerns about radical trends in the African-American Muslim community. Works Cited 1.  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚   African Muslims in Antebellum American by Allen Austin, 1984 2.  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚   The Arab World Published by the Arab-American Press, 1945 3.  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚   African Presence in Early America by Ivan Van Serbia, 1987

Most Opposition to Abortion Relies Essay Example for Free

Most Opposition to Abortion Relies Essay A Defense of Abortion Author(s): Judith Jarvis Thomson Source: Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Autumn, 1971), pp. 47-66 Published by: Blackwell Publishing Stable URL: http://www. jstor. org/stable/2265091 Accessed: 10/01/2010 00:54 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTORs Terms and Conditions of Use, available at http://www. jstor. org/page/info/about/policies/terms. jsp. JSTORs Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at http://www. jstor. org/action/showPublisher? publisherCode=black. Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission. JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [emailprotected] org. Blackwell Publishing is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Philosophy and Public Affairs. http://www. jstor. org JUDITH JARVISTHOMSON A Defense of Abortion Most opposition to abortion relies on the premise that the fetus is a human being, a person, from the moment of conception. The premise is argued for, but, as I think, not well. Take, for example, the most common argument. We are asked to notice that the development of a human being from conception through birth into childhood is continuous; then it is said that to draw a line, to choose a point in this development and say before this point the thing is not a person, after this point it is a person is to make an arbitrary choice, a choice for which in the nature of things no good reason can be given. It is concluded that the fetus is, or anyway that we had better say it is, a person from the moment of conception. But this conclusion does not follow. Similar things might be said about the development of an acorn into an oak tree, and it does not follow that acorns are oak trees, or that we had better say they are. Arguments of this form are sometimes called slippery slope arguments-the phrase is perhaps self-explanatory-and it is dismaying that opponents of abortion rely on them so heavily and uncritically. I am inclined to agree, however, that the prospects for drawing a line in the development of the fetus look dim. I am inclined to think also that we shall probably have to agree that the fetus has already become a human person well before birth. Indeed, it comes as a surprise when one first learns how early in its life it begins to acquire human characteristics. By the tenth week, for example, it already has i. I am very much indebted to James Thomson for discussion, criticism, and many helpful suggestions. 48 Philosophy ; Public Affairs a face, arms and legs, fingers and toes; it has internal organs, and brain activity is detectable. 2 On the other hand, I think that the premise is false, that the fetus is not a person from the moment of conception. A newly fertilized ovum, a newly implanted clump of cells, is no more a person than an acorn is an oak tree. But I shall not discuss any of this. For it seems to me to be of great interest to ask what happens if, for the sake of argument, we allow the premise. How, precisely, are we supposed to get from there to the conclusion that abortion is morally impermissible? Opponents of abortion commonly spend most of their time establishing that the fetus is a person, and hardly any time explaining the step from there to the impermissibility of abortion. Perhaps they think the step too simple and obvious to require much comment. Or perhaps instead they are simply being economical in argument. Many of those who defend abortion rely on the premise that the fetus is not a person, but only a bit of tissue that will become a person at birth; and why pay out more arguments than you have to? Whatever the explanation, I suggest that the step they take is neither easy nor obvious, that it calls for closer examination than it is commonly given, and that when we do give it this closer examination we shall feel inclined to reject it. I propose, then, that we grant that the fetus is a person. from the moment of conception. How does the argument go from here? Something like this, I take it. Every person has a right to life. So the fetus has a right to life. No doubt the mother has a right to decide what shall happen in and to her body; everyone would grant that. But surely a persons right to life is stronger and more stringent than the mothers right to decide what happens in and to her body, and so outweighs it. So the fetus may not be killed; an abortion may not be performed. It sounds plausible. But now let me ask you to imagine this. You wake up in the morning and find yourself back to back in bed with an unconscious violinist. A famous unconscious violinist. He has been found to have a fatal kidney ailment, and the Society of Music Lovers 2. Daniel Callahan, Abortion: Law, Choice and Morality (New York, 1970), p. 373. This book gives a fascinating survey of the available information on abortion. The Jewish tradition is surveyed in David M. Feldman, Birth Control in Jewish Law (New York, i968), Part 5, the Catholic tradition in John T. Noonan, Jr. , An Almost Absolute Value in History, in The Morality of Abortion, ed. John T. Noonan, Jr. (Cambridge, Mass. , 1970). 49 A Defense of Abortion has canvassed all the available medical records and found that you alone have the right blood type to help. They have therefore kidnapped you, and last night the violinists circulatory system was plugged into yours, so that your kidneys can be used to extract poisons from his blood as well as your own. The director of the hospital now tells you, Look, were sorry the Society of Music Lovers did this to you-we would never have permitted it if we had known. But still, they did it, and the violinist now is plugged into you. To unplug you would be to kill him. But never mind, its only for nine months. By then he will have recovered from his ailment, and can safely be unplugged from you. Is it morally incumbent on you to accede to this situation? No doubt it would be very nice of you if you did, a great kindness. But do you have to accede to it? What if it were not nine months, but nine years? Or longer still? What if the director of the hospital says, Tough luck, I agree, but youve now got to stay in bed, with the violinist plugged into you, for the rest of your life. Because remember this. All persons have a right to life, and violinists are persons. Granted you have a right to decide what happens in and to your body, but a persons right to life outweighs your right to decide what happens in and to your body. So you cannot ever be unplugged from him. I imagine you would regard this as outrageous, which suggests that something really is wrong with that plausible-sounding argument I mentioned a moment ago. In this case, of course, you were kidnapped; you didnt volunteer for the operation that plugged the violinist into your kidneys. Can those who oppose abortion on the ground I mentioned make an exception for a pregnancy due to rape? Certainly. They can say that persons have a right to life only if they didnt come into existence because of rape; or they can say that all persons have a right to life, but that some have less of a right to life than others, in particular, that those who came into existence because of rape have less. But these statements have a rather unpleasant sound. Surely the question of whether you have a right to life at all, or how much of it you have, shouldnt turn on the question of whether or not you are the product of a rape. And in fact the people who oppose abortion on the ground I mentioned do not make this distinction, and hence do not make an exception in case of rape. 50 Philosophy ; Public Affairs Nor do they make an exception for a case in which the mother has to spend the nine months of her pregnancy in bed. They would agree that would be a great pity, and hard on the mother; but all the same, all persons have a right to ife, the fetus is a person, and so on. I suspect, in fact, that they would not make an exception for a case in which, miraculously enough, the pregnancy went on for nine years, or even the rest of the mothers life. Some wont even make an exception for a case in which continuation of the pregnancy is likely to shorten the mothers life; they regard abortion as impermissible even to save the mothers life. Such case s are nowadays very rare, and many opponents of abortion do not accept this extreme view. Moreover, in killing the child, one would be killing an innocent person, for the child has committed no crime, and is not aiming at his mothers death. And then there are a variety of ways in which this 3. The term direct in the arguments I refer to is a technical one. Roughly, what is meant by direct killing is either killing as an end in itself, or killing as a means to some end, for example, the end of saving someone elses life. See note 6, below, for an example of its use. 51 A Defense of Abortion might be continued. i) But as directly killing an innocent person is always and absolutely impermissible, an abortion may not be performed. Or, (2) as directly killing an innocent person is murder, and murder is always and absolutely impermissible, an abortion may not be performed. Because unplugging you would be directly killing an innocent violinist, and thats murder, and thats impermissible. If anything in the world is true, it is that you do not commit murder, you do not do what is impermissible, if you reach around to your back and unplug yourself from that violinist to save your life. The main focus of attention in writings on abortion has been on what a third party may or may not do in answer to a request from a woman for an abortion. This is in a way understandable. Things being as they are, there isnt much a woman can safely do to abort herself. So the question asked is what a third party may do, and what the mother may do, if it is mentioned at all, is deduced, almost as an afterthought, from what it is concluded that third parties may do. But it seems to me that to treat the matter in this way is to refuse to grant to the mother that very status of person which is so firmly insisted on for the fetus. For we cannot simply read off what a person may do from what a third party may do. Suppose you find yourself trapped in a tiny house with a growing child. I mean a very tiny house, and a rapidly growing child-you are already up against the wall f the house and in a few minutes youll be crushed to death. The child on the other hand wont be crushed to death; if nothing is done to stop him from growing hell be hurt, but in the end hell simply burst open the house and walk out a free man. Now I could well understand it if a bystander were to say, Theres nothing we can do for you. We cannot choose between your life and his, we cann ot be the ones to decide who is to live, we cannot intervene. But it cannot be concluded that you too can do nothing, that you cannot attack it to save your life. However innocent the child may be, you do not have to wait passively while it crushes you to death. Perhaps a pregnant woman is vaguely felt to have the status of house, to which we dont allow the 53 A Defense of Abortion right of self-defense. But if the woman houses the child, it should be remembered that she is a person who houses it. 1 should perhaps stop to say explicitly that I am not claiming that people have a right to do anything whatever to save their lives. I think, rather, that there are drastic limits to the right of self-defense. If someone threatens you with death unless you torture someone else to death, I think you have not the right, even to save your life, to do so. But the case under consideration here is very different. In our case there are only two people involved, one whose life is threatened, and one who threatens it. Both are innocent: the one who is threatened is not threatened because of any fault, the one who threatens does not threaten because of any fault. For this reason we may feel that we bystanders cannot intervene. But the person threatened can. In sum, a woman surely can defend her life against the threat to it posed by the unborn child, even if doing so involves its death. And this shows not merely that the theses in (i) through (4) are false; it shows also that the extreme view of abortion is false, and so we need not canvass any other possible ways of arriving at it from the argument I mentioned at the outset. 2. The extreme view could of course be weakened to say that while abortion is permissible to save the mothers life, it may not be performed by a third party, but only by the mother herself. But this cannot be right either. For what we have to keep in mind is that the mother and the unborn child are not like two tenants in a small house which has, by an unfortunate mistake, been rented to both: the mother owns the house. The fact that she does adds to the offensiveness of deducing that the mother can do nothing from the supposition that third parties can do nothing. But it does more than this: it casts a bright light on the supposition that third parties can do nothing. Certainly it lets us see that a third party who says I cannot choose between you is fooling himself if he thinks this is impartiality. If Jones has found and fastened on a certain coat, which he needs to keep him from freezing, but which Smith also needs to keep him from freezing, then it is not impartiality that says I cannot choose between you when Smith owns the coat. Women have said again and again This body is my body! and they have reason to feel angry, reason to feel that it has been like shouting into the wind. Smith, after all, is 54 Philosophy Public Affairs hardly likely to bless us if we say to him, Of course its your coat, anybody would grant that it is. But no one may choose between you and Jones who is to have it. We should really ask what it is that says no one may choose in the face of the fact that the body that houses the child is the mothers body. It may be simply a failure to appreciate this fact. But it may be something more interesting, namely the sense that one has a right to refuse to lay hands on people, even where it would be just and fair to do so, even where justice seems to require t hat somebody do so. Thus justice might call for somebody to get Smiths coat back from Jones, and yet you have a right to refuse to be the one to lay hands on Jones, a right to refuse to do physical violence to him. This, I think, must be granted. But then what should be said is not no one may choose, but only I cannot choose, and indeed not even this, but I will not act, leaving it open that somebody else can or should, and in particular that anyone in a position of authority, with the job of securing peoples rights, both can and should. So this is no difficulty. I have not been arguing that any given third party must accede to the mothers request that he perform an abortion to save her life, but only that he may. I suppose that in some views of human life the mothers body is only on loan to her, the loan not being one which gives her any prior claim to it. One who held this view might well think it impartiality to say I cannot choose. But I shall simply ignore this possibility. My own view is that if a human being has any just, prior claim to anything at all, he has a just, prior claim to his own body. And perhaps this neednt be argued for here anyway, since, as I mentioned, the arguments against abortion we are looking at do grant that the woman has a right to decide what happens in and to her body. But although they do grant it, I have tried to show that they do not take seriously what is done in granting it. I suggest the same thing will reappear even more clearly when we turn away from cases in which the mothers life is at stake, and attend, as I propose we now do, to the vastly more common cases in which a woman wants an abortion for some less weighty reason than preserving her own life. 3. Where the mothers life is not at stake, the argument I mentioned at the outset seems to have a much stronger pull. Everyone 55 A Defense of Abortion as a right to life, so the unborn person has a right to life. And isnt the childs right to life weightier than anything other than the mothers own right to life, which she might put forward as ground for an abortion? This argument treats the right to life as if it were unproblematic. It is not, and this seems to me to be precisely the source of the mistake. For we should now, at long last, ask what it comes to, to have a right to life. In so me views having a right to life includes having a right to be given at least the bare minimum one needs for continued life. But suppose that what in fact is the bare minimum a man needs for continued life is something he has no right at all to be given? If I am sick unto death, and the only thing that will save my life is the touch of Henry Fondas cool hand on my fevered brow, then all the same, I have no right to be given the touch of Henry Fondas cool hand on my fevered brow. It would be frightfully nice of him to fly in from the West Coast to provide it. It would be less nice, though no doubt well meant, if my friends flew out to the West Coast and carried Henry Fonda back with them. But I have no right at all against anybody that he should do this for me. Or again, to return to the story I told earlier, the fact that for continued life that violinist needs the continued use of your kidneys does not establish that he has a right to be given the continued use of your kidneys. He certainly has no right against you that you should give him continued use of your kidneys. For nobody has any right to use your kidneys unless you give him such a right; and nobody has the right against you that you shall give him this right-if you do allow him to go on using your kidneys, this is a kindness on your part, and not something he can claim from you as his due. Nor has he any right against anybody else that they should give him continued use of your kidneys. Certainly he had no right against the Society of Music Lovers that they should plug him into you in the first place. And if you now start to unplug yourself, having learned that you will otherwise have to spend nine years in bed with him, there is nobody in the world who must try to prevent you, in order to see to it that he is given something he has a right to be given. Some people are rather stricter about the right to life. In their view, it does not include the right to be given anything, but amounts to, 56 Philosophy Public Affairs and only to, the right not to be killed by anybody. But here a related difficulty arises. If everybody is to refrain from killing that violinist, then everybody must refrain from doing a great many different sorts of things. Everybody must refrain from slitting his throat, everybody must refrain from shooting him-and everybody must refrain from unplugging you from him. But does he have a right against everybody that they shall refrain from unplugging you from him? To refrain from doing this is to allow him to continue to use your kidneys. It could be argued that he has a right against us that we should allow him to continue to use your kidneys. That is, while he had no right against us that we should give him the use of your kidneys, it might be argued that he anyway has a right against us that we shall not now intervene and deprive him of the use of your kidneys. I shall come back to third-party interventions later. But certainly the violinist has no right against you that you shall allow him to continue to use your kidneys. As I said, if you do allow him to use them, it is a kindness on your part, and not something you owe him. The difficulty I point to here is not peculiar to the right to life. It reappears in connection with all the other natural rights; and it is something which an adequate account of rights must deal with. For present purposes it is enough just to draw attention to it. But I would stress that I am not arguing that people do not have a right to lifequite to the contrary, it seems to me that the primary control we must place on the acceptability of an account of rights is that it should turn out in that account to be a truth that all persons have a right to life. I am arguing only that having a right to life does not guarantee having either a right to be given the use of or a right to be allowed continued use of another persons body-even if one needs it for life itself. So the right to life will not serve the opponents of abortion in the very simple and clear way in which they seem to have thought it would. 4. There is another way to bring out the difficulty. In the most ordinary sort of case, to deprive someone of what he has a right to is to treat him unjustly. Suppose a boy and his small brother are jointly given a box of chocolates for Christmas. If the older boy takes the box and refuses to give his brother any of the chocolates, he is unjust to -him, for the brother has been given a right to half of them. But 57 A Defense of Abortion uppose that, having learned that otherwise it means nine years in bed with that violinist, you unplug yourself from him. You surely are not being unjust to him, for you gave him no right to use your kidneys, and no one else can have given him any such right. But we have to notice that in unplugging yourself, you are killing him; and violinists, like everybody else, have a right to life, and thus in the view we wer e considering just now, the right not to be killed. So here you do what he supposedly has a right you shall not do, but you do not act unjustly to him in doing it. The emendation which may be made at this point is this: the right to life consists not in the right not to be killed, but rather in the right not to be killed unjustly. This runs a risk of circularity, but never mind: it would enable us to square the fact that the violinist has a right to life with the fact that you do not act unjustly toward him in unplugging yourself, thereby killing him. For if you do not kill him unjustly, you do not violate his right to life, and so it is no wonder you do him no injustice. But if this emendation is accepted, the gap in the argument against abortion stares us plainly in the face: it is by no means enough to show that the fetus is a person, and to remind us that all persons have a right to life-we need to be shown also that killing the fetus violates its right to life, i. e. , that abortion is unjust killing. And is it? I suppose we may take it as a datum that in a case of pregnancy due to rape the mother has not given the unborn person a right to the use of her body for food and shelter. Indeed, in what pregnancy could it be supposed that the mother has given the unborn person such a right? It is not as if there were unborn persons drifting about the world, to whom a woman who wants a child says I invite you in. But it might be argued that there are other ways one can have acquired a right to the use of another persons body than by having been invited to use it by that person. Suppose a woman voluntarily indulges in intercourse, knowing of the chance it will issue in pregnancy, and then she does become pregnant; is she not in part responsible for the presence, in fact the very existence, of the unborn person inside her? No doubt she did not invite it in. But doesnt her partial responsibility for its being there itself give it a right to the use of her 58 Philosophy ; Public Affairs body? 7 If so, then her aborting it would be more like the boys taking away the chocolates, and less like your unplugging yourself from the violinist-doing so would be depriving it of what it does have a right to, and thus would be doing it an injustice. And then, too, it might be asked whether or not she can kill it even to save her own life: If she voluntarily called it into existence, how can she now kill it, even in self-defense? The first thing to be said about this is that it is something new. Opponents of abortion have been so concerned to make out the independence of the fetus, in order to establish that it has a right to life, just as its mother does, that they have tended to overlook the possible support they might gain from making out that the fetus is dependent on the mother, in order to establish that she has a special kind of responsibility for it, a responsibility that gives it rights against her which are not possessed by any independent person-such as an ailing violinist who is a stranger to her. On the other hand, this argument would give the unborn person a right to its mothers body only if her pregnancy resulted from a voluntary act, undertaken in full knowledge of the chance a pregnancy might result from it. It would leave out entirely the unborn person whose existence is due to rape. Pending the availability of some further argument, then, we would be left with the conclusion that unborn persons whose existence is due to rape have no right to the use of their mothers bodies, and thus that aborting them is not depriving them of anything they have a right to and hence is not unjust killing. And we should also notice that it is not at all plain that this argument really does go even as far as it purports to. For there are cases and cases, and the details make a difference. If the room is stuffy, and I therefore open a window to air it, and a burglar climbs in, it would be absurd to say,Ah, now he can stay, shes given him a right to the use of her house-for she is partially responsible for his presence there, having voluntarily done what enabled him to get in, in full knowledge that there are such things as burglars, and that burglars 7. The need for a discussion of this argument was brought home to me by members of the Society for Ethical and Legal Philosophy, to whom this paper was originally presented. 59 A Defense of Abortion burgle. It would be still more absurd to say this if I had had bars installed outside my windows, precisely to prevent burglars from getting in, and a burglar got in only because of a defect in the bars. It remains equally absurd if we imagine it is not a burglar who climbs in, but an innocent person who blunders or falls in. Again, suppose it were like this: people-seeds drift about in the air like pollen, and if you open your windows, one may drift in and take root in your carpets or upholstery. You dont want children, so you fix up your windows with fine mesh screens, the very best you can buy. As can happen, however, and on very, very rare occasions does happen, one of the screens is defective; and a seed drifts in and takes root. Does the person-plant who now develops have a right to the use of your house? Surely not-despite the fact that you voluntarily opened your windows, you knowingly kept carpets and upholstered furniture, and you knew that screens were sometimes defective. Someone may argue that you are responsible for its rooting, that it does have a right to your house, because after all you could have lived out your life with bare floors and furniture, or with sealed windows and doors. But this wont do-for by the same token anyone can avoid a pregnancy due to rape by having a hysterectomy, or anyway by never leaving home without a (reliable! army. It seems to me that the argument we are looking at can establish at most that there are some cases in which the unborn person has a right to the use of its mothers body, and therefore some cases in which abortion is unjust killing. There is room for much discussion and argument as to precisely which, if any. But I think we should sidestep this issue and leave it open, for at any rate the argument certainly does not establish that al l abortion is unjust killing. 5. There is room for yet another argument here, however. We surely must all grant that there may be cases in which it would be morally indecent to detach a person from your body at the cost of his life. Suppose you learn that what the violinist needs is not nine years of your life, but only one hour: all you need do to save his life is to spend one hour in that bed with him. Suppose also that letting him use your kidneys for that one hour would not affect your health in the slightest. Admittedly you were kidnapped. Admittedly you did not give 6o Philosophy Public Affairs anyone permission to plug him into you. Nevertheless it seems to me plain you ought to allow him to use your kidneys for that hour-it would be indecent to refuse. Again, suppose pregnancy lasted only an hour, and constituted no threat to life or health. And suppose that a woman becomes pregnant as a result of rape. Admittedly she did not voluntarily do anything to bring about the existence of a child. Admittedly she did nothing at all which would give the unborn person a right to the use of her body. All the same it might well be said, as in the newly emended violinist story, that she ought to allow it to remain for that hour-that it would be indecent in her to refuse. Now some people are inclined to use the term rightin such a way that it follows from the fact that you ought to allow a person to use your body for the hour he needs, that he has a right to use your body for the hour he needs, even though he has not been given that right by any person or act. They may say that it follows also that if you refuse, you act unjustly toward him. This use of the term is perhaps so common that it cannot be called wrong; nevertheless it seems to me to be an unfortunate loosening of what we would do better to keep a tight rein on. Suppose that box of chocolates I mentioned earlier had not been given to both boys jointly, but was given only to the older boy. There he sits, stolidly eating his way through the box, his small brother watching enviously. Here we are likely to say Youought not to be so mean. You ought to give your brother some of those chocolates. My own view is that it just does not follow from the truth of this that the brother has any right to any of the chocolates. If the boy refuses to give his brother any, he is greedy, stingy, callous-but not unjust. I suppose that the people I have in mind will say it does follow that the brother has a right to some of the chocolates, and thus that the boy does act unjustly if he refuses to give his brother any. But the effect of saying this is to obscure what we should keep distinct, namely the difference between the boys refusal in this case and the boys refusal in the earlier case, in which the box was given to both boys jointly, and in which the small brother thus had what was from any point of view clear title to half. A further objection to so using the term rightthat from the fact that A ought to do a thing for B, it follows that B has a right against A 6I A Defense of Abortion that A do it for him, is that it is going to make the question of whether or not a man has a right to a thing turn on how easy it is to provide him with it; and this seems not merely unfortunate, but morally unacceptable. Take the case of Henry Fonda again. I said earlier that I had no right to the touch of his cool hand on my fevered brow, even though I needed it to save my life. I said it would be frightfully nice of him to fly in from the West Coast to provide me with it, but that I had no right against him that he should do so. But suppose he isnt on the West Coast. Suppose he has only to walk across the room, place a hand briefly on my brow-and lo, my life is saved. Then surely he ought to do it, it would be indecent to refuse. Is it to be said Ah, well, it follows that in this case she has a right to the touch of his hand on her brow, and so it would be an injustice in him to refuse? So that I have a right to it when it is easy for him to provide it, though no right when its hard? Its rather a shocking idea that anyones rights should fade away and disappear as it gets harder and harder to accord them to him. So my own view is that even though you ought to let the violinist use your kidneys for the one hour he needs, we should not conclude that he has a right to do so-we should say that if you refuse, you are, like the boy who owns all the chocolates and will give none away, self-centered and callous, indecent in fact, but not unjust. And similarly, that even supposing a case in which a woman pregnant due to rape ought to allow the unborn person to use her body for the hour he needs, we should not conclude that he has a right to do so; we should conclude that she is self-centered, callous, indecent, but not unjust, if she refuses. The complaints are no less grave; they are just different. However, there is no need to insist on this point. If anyone does wish to deduce he has a ight from you ought, then all the same he must surely grant that there are cases in which it is not morally required of you that you allow that violinist to use your kidneys, and in which he does not have a right to use them, and in which you do not do him an injustice if you refuse. And so also for mother and unborn child. Except in such cases as the unborn person has a right to demand it-and we were leaving open the possibility that there may be such cases-nobody is morally required to make large sacrifices, of health, of all other interes ts and concerns, of all other duties 62 Philosophy Public Affairs and commitments, for nine years, or even for nine months, in order to keep another person alive. 6. We have in fact to distinguish between two kinds of Samaritan: the Good Samaritan and what we might call the Minimally Decent Samaritan. The story of the Good Samaritan, you will remember, goes like this: A certain man went down from Jerusalem to Jericho, and fell among thieves, which stripped him of his raiment, and wounded him, and departed, leaving him half dead. And by chance there came down a certain priest that way; and when he saw him, he passed by on the other side. And likewise a Levite, when he was at the place, came and looked on him, and passed by on the other side. But a certain Samaritan, as he journeyed, came where he was; and when he saw him he had compassion on him. And went to him, and bound up his wounds, pouring in oil and wine, and set him on his own beast, and brought him to an inn, and took care of him. And on the morrow, when he departed, he took out two pence, and gave them to the host, and said unto him, Take care of him; and whatsoever thou spendest more, when I come again, I will repay thee. (Luke I0:30-35) The Good Samaritan went out of his way, at some cost to himself, to help one in need of it. We are not told what the options were, that is, whether or not the priest and the Levite could have helped by doing less than the Good Samaritan did, but assuming they could have, then the fact they did nothing at all shows they were not even Minimally Decent Samaritans, not because they were not Samaritans, but because they were n ot even minimally decent. These things are a matter of degree, of course, but there is a difference, and it comes out perhaps most clearly in the story of Kitty Genovese, who, as you will remember, was murdered while thirtyeight people watched or listened, and did nothing at all to help her. A Good Samaritan would have rushed out to give direct assistance 63 A Defense of Abortion against the murderer. Or perhaps we had better allow that it would have been a Splendid Samaritan who did this, on the ground that it would have involved a risk of death for himself. But the thirty-eight not only did not do this, they did not even trouble to pick up a phone to call the police. Minimally Decent Samaritanism would call for doing at least that, and their not having done it was monstrous. After telling the story of the Good Samaritan, Jesus said Go, and do thou likewise. Perhaps he meant that we are morally required to act as the Good Samaritan did. Perhaps he was urging people to do more than is morally required of them. At all events it seems plain that it was not morally required of any of the thirty-eight that he rush out to give direct assistance at the risk of his own life, and that it is not morally required of anyone that he give long stretches of his lifenine years or nine months-to sustaining the life of a person who has no special right (we were leaving open the possibility of this) to demand it. Indeed, with one rather striking class of exceptions, no one in any country in the world is legally required to do anywhere near as much as this for anyone else.

Effect of Contract Based Labourers on Indias Automobiles

Effect of Contract Based Labourers on Indias Automobiles Research Question: How are contract based labourers affecting the productivity of Indian automobile industry? Introduction Research Origin and Focus Area of Research The employment structure in the Indian scenario has been undergoing certain changes due to globalization. The firms in order to be competitive in a global market should have the flexibility relating to labour, capital and various bureaucratic procedures. Only then can it adapt itself to the rapidly changing environment and thereby stay ahead. Although, it has been said that the stringent labour laws not only put the domestic producers at a disadvantageous position but it is also one of the primary factor causing less inflow of foreign direct investment and eventually impact adversely on investment, output and employment. As a result, number of countries has amended their labour laws so as to make them more investment and employment friendly. This has thereby led to different non-permanent employment structures, such as casual labour, contract labour, subcontractors, consultants and others, among which contract labour is the most prominent kind in the Indian industrial sector and in this paper I primarily focus on the Indian automobile sector only at present. In this research, the point to be noted is the contractual employment which is in accordance to the Contract Labour Regulation and Abolition Act, 1970. According to the law, a contract labourer is defined as one who is hired in connection with the work of an establishment by a principal employer through a contractor. Although a contractor tries to produce the given results with the help of a contract labour for the organisation, a principal employer is the person responsible for the control of an establishment. Over the years the pace of contracting has increased dramatically both across borders as well as within. The research will be dealing with the effect of these outsourcing activities. According to the WTO-ILO report (2009), contracting has largely taken place in the emerging economies. Now what could be the consequences of contracting on the labour productivity of a particular firm within the country is what this research paper will be discussing about. Although a lot has been discussed about the rights in terms of wages and other emoluments for the contractual labour, not much has been said about the productivity of the contractual labour. Much has been said recently about the slowdown in the Indian automobile industry, in fact this sector of the Indian manufacturing industries has recorded its lowest point in terms of growth past year. In this research paper, I have taken up the issue of subcontracting of labourers as the one of the primary reason for this lag in productivity. The organised auto sector in India broadly consists of three tiers and the Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) sit at the top of the chain. Most of these OEMs are members of the Society of Indian Automobile Manufacturers (SIAM), while most of the tier 1 auto component manufacturers are members of the Automobile Component Manufacturers’ Association (ACMA). Tier-2 and Tier-3 auto-component manufacturers are relatively smaller players. To assess the importance of the sub sectors in terms of generation of employment, it is essential to analyse the intensity of labour employment in these sectors. There is a concern in the industry that wages are growing for the permanent labours without proportionate increase in the productivity front. As a result, higher subcontracting takes place in order to curb wage costs both in the periphery as well as in the core sector. Contract labourers, paid comparatively much lower than the permanent employees and enjoying hardly any other benefits, make up 70-80% of the industry workforce, according to estimates by trade union leaders. The underlying tension between their aspirations and outdated labour laws cause dispute and de-incentivise work effort and lowering productivity. Literature Review In order to proceed with the analysis of subcontracting and productivity, there are literature which illustrate the importance of investment in RD. Romer (1990) has stated on the â€Å"endogenous technological change† and hence proved how RD plays an instrumental role in accelerating long run growth of a country. Thereafter, many works have been published citing the role of variable factors on RD and long term growth, which varies from economy to economy. Scholars like Goo (2011) mentioned the effects of transportation costs in RD technology sector on the endogenous growth. He showed that larger the transportation costs of RD technology, larger will be the price of RD technology and hence leading to slower economic growth. Lee (2005) empirically showed a direct and much stronger effect of information networks on international RD. Research in relation to this field by eminent economists has also discussed the strategically important interactions of firms and their implication of RD of firms and the performances. Grossman and Helpman (2002, 2003), Egger and Egger (2003), Shy and Stenbacka (2003) and Antras and Helpman (2004) established the positives of outsourcing over any other organizational structures, for example the vertical integration and foreign direct investment. If outsourcing and RD are complementary to each other, outsourcing leads to an increase in RD, which leads to a reduction of the negative impact of outsourcing on wages and employment in the outsourced countries. Based on a similar framework, Marjit and Mukherjee (2008) argued that outsourcing has a positive relationship with the RD investment and hence an increase in outsourcing causes an increase in the RD investment in small markets and highly competitive product market, whereas it decreases the RD investment in large markets Based on the efficiency wage models, which talk about the positive effect of higher wages (Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984; Banerjee and Gupta, 1998), have shown a direct effect on labour productivity of higher wages, as result of greater incentive. Hence, a decline in wage mean declining productivity and the entrepreneurs might be reluctant to reduce the wage, even in the situations of unemployment. That is the key argument explaining unemployment and wage rigidity at the same time. Dibyendu Maiti and Sugata Marjit (2011) had focused on the subcontracting part of a typical firm to the informal sector for a developing economy. Although, these literature give us the basis of contractual labour hiring practices, but they do not mention much about the productivity perspective. Dibyendu Maiti and Sugata Marjit (2011) gave an overview of the productivity and subcontracting issue for a developing economy, this research study will only deal with the Indian automobile sector as its primary domain. Research Design and Methodology Starting with a simple framework of a firm, which has two alternatives to hire labourers, i.e. either using subcontracting way at a lower cost or it can go for permanent employment of labourers. The formal wage structure is determined exogenously at each level whereas the contractual labourers’ wages are determined endogenously by the market and using the bargaining power of the contractor. Also assuming, is the fact that contractual labour wage rate do not adjust rapidly in the short run. In case of a rise, in the wage rates of the permanent labourers the firm would go for contractual hiring, thereby increasing the demand for temporary labourers in turn leading to an increase in wages. In the short run time period, if the contractual wage rises, the firm would opt for the existing permanent labourers, which again leads to an increase in the demand for permanent labourers. With this relation between the wages of both the contractual and permanent labourers, we can establish th e fact that the contractual wage and permanent wage would be correlated. Although from a long run view, the contractual wage is adjusted by the market forces. The net effect of the above interactions between the contractual and permanent wage determines the level of wage and employment in a particular sector. In order to analyse the study, information from secondary sources of Indian database is collected. With these dataset, and to establish a significant relationship between the wages and productivity regression analysis has to be done. The study takes the annual emoluments for hired workers in Non-Directory Manufacturing Establishments (NDME) documented by National Sample Survey Organisation, Government of India and annual emoluments of the various factory workers documented by Annual Survey of Industries, Government of India, Society of Indian Automobile Manufacturers (SIAM) and Automobile Component Manufacturers’ Association (ACMA). Running pooled OLS regression with state and time as dummy variables and panel GLS regressions to estimate the relationship between contractual wage and formal productivity, and formal wage and formal productivity controlling other variables. With the results for the regression analysis it can be showed that the correlation between formal wage and formal productivity is not statistically significant, while for the formal productivity and informal wage it is highly significant and with the GLS panel regression, it can be proved that formal productivity is highly affected by informal wage. The formal or the permanent workers’ sector does not necessarily affect the contractual workers’ sector in the long term. If the permanent wage increases, the firm will transfer its production activities from its in house permanent sector to external contractual sector which leads to two effects on the contractual wage rate. Firstly, a substitution effect would raise the demand for contract labours. The discharged labours from the formal sector due to shortage of production would also supply more labour. Therefore, the net effect remains ambiguous. If the contract labour sector have a net positive demand for labours, it would increase the employment and it would raise the informal wage when the economy is at its full employment level. Again, if net demand is negative, it might also reduce the contractual wage. This situation alters the efficiency gain of permanent labours and also brings down the condition for the contract sector. Thus a developing economy or an economy with a higher number of poor populations will have less productive permanent sector. This indicates that when a society has a greater number of poor informal workers, those who are fortunate enough to land up with relatively high-wage jobs may not be as productive as they would be in a society where access to the low wage informal segment restricted.

Compare and contrast the poems The Tyger and The Donkey and Essay

Compare and contrast the poems The Tyger and The Donkey and discuss which poet gives us the clearest depiction of humanity. William Blake is a wealthy, upper-class writer who separates himself from the rest of the wealthy community. Blake has a hate for the techniques used by many of the wealthy, company owners who gain and capitalise through cheap and expendable labour, supplied by the ever-growing poverty in the country. Blake makes a point to try and reveal this industrial savagery through his work. "The Tyger" is presented as a metaphorical approach to the struggle between the rich and the poor; good and evil. The several references to good and evil reinforce this idea and meaning. "The Tyger" holds one great metaphorical element, which is, what created the tiger? Good or evil? It raises many theories for the tiger's existence but the main point is to show that there is good and evil in everyone and everything. Blake shows us how something so beautiful can really be both beautiful but still retain a certain ferocity and savagery. Such as the wealthy factory owners of the 18th century, they offered a well-paid job and good employment benefits, but that was all just a faà §ade. The truth was cramped and dangerous working conditions, low pay and long hours; yet the people continued to labour in these factories at their own expense, while the wealthy owner sat back and watched workers toil and cash flow. The metaphor for this is like temptation, desperation and greed can lead people to be fooled, though true these people weren't greedy yet they were desperate for money to survive, although they could not judge correctly for themselves and became entrapped in the businessman's deception. Just like "The T... ...tent, the final stanza sums up everything within the poem, after all the questions it comes to a conclusion in the form of a final question: "What immortal hand or eye dare frame thy fearful symmetry?" "The Donkey" has a unique rhythm, one that also relates to the animal being referred to. The rhyme pattern imitates the donkeys walk, 1-2-1-2, this concept isn't easily recognised, but to notice it, shows the depth of the poem. Chesterton either included this simply by chance or meant to do it, which shows a strong backbone to his writings. Both poems are similar in many respects and both writers share common ideas, the use of animals to portray ideas and the views they have about human kind. Both "The Tyger" and "The Donkey" show elements of each other, and this is reflected in the writer, two great minds, with great mindsets on life and human kind.

The Joy Luck Club Essay -- essays research papers fc

Everybody is different despite which culture they’re from, religion they practice or beliefs they accept as true. Finding one person of your same culture, practicing your same religion and believing all the exact, same ideas as you do is practically impossible. There are always a few factors that make you different from this person, and this idea is acceptable to most. Why then, if one found they were almost identical in thoughts and feelings as another individual, but found that this individual was of a different race, would this be considered unacceptable? There lingers an aroma of ignorance and naive ness around a few that make it so they’re blinded to the idea that a difference in ethnic backgrounds does not make a person inferior or superior. If one were to be categorized as inferior or superior, it would have to be based on their actions: whether it be wrong doings or accomplishments. The main characters in this story are a generation of mothers and their daughters. This story is told in sections as a narrative, where each chapter is recounted by a different woman. The mothers speak of their experiences growing up under the strict conditions in China. They told of how their marriages were predetermined and how they had to do as any male ordered. The daughters, on the other hand, being raised under American ways, told of their hardships with pressure given to them by their mothers. They spoke of American husbands, equality between both sexes, and how they’d rather believe that their futures could indeed be controlled. This novel being reviewed for recommendation in minority studies is The Joy Luck Club by Amy Tan, where the minority groups being presented are both the Chinese Gelman – Page 2 and women. The view seen of women in the United States is that of a rising class; once always under the wing of a male, but in the present day, rising to achieve equality. The view seen of Chinese women though, still remains that they are being held in the male’s shadow. â€Å"Reading scores†¦ and math scores†¦ for minority students are falling further behind those of white students† (Heartland Institute). This is from a report taken in the United States, which could be applied to China as well. There, though, only the women are the minority, instead of all Chinese. The Chinese men got the better educations,... ... get across to the youth before they have a mind of their own, they’d learn not to even notice the color of one’s skin, but to look only into their eyes, which is a doorway to what the mind thinks, the heart feels and the body experiences. Gelman – Page 6 Bibliography Hart’s War. Dir. Gregory Hoblit. With Bruce Willis, Colin Farrell, Terrence Dashon Howard, Vicellous Reon Shannon, Cole Hauser, Rory Cochrane and Marcel Iures. MGM, 2001. McAlister, Linda Lopez. â€Å"‘The Joy Luck Club’ A Film Review.† The Women’s Show. WMNF-FM (88.5). Tampa, FL. 02 Oct. 1993. RARA Foundation. â€Å"Minority Role Models.† n.d: n.pag. On-line. Internet. 21 Feb. 2002 Available WWW: HYPERLINK "http://www.minrm.com/index.html" http://www.minrm.com/index.html The Heartland Institute: School Reform News. â€Å"Minority Academic Progress Falters.† Jan. 1997: n.pag. On-line. Internet. 21 Feb. 2002 Available WWW: http://www.heartland.org/education/jan97/minority.html Tan, Amy. The Joy Luck Club. Maine: Thorndike, 1989

An Unwinnable War Essay -- American History, The War on Terrorism

As America find herself in today’s â€Å"War on Terrorism,† one can easily find a number of similarities between today’s situation and the war in Vietnam. As the Taliban steadily loses control and power over Afghanistan, it becomes exceedingly important to discuss potential replacement governments. Afghanistan is, like Vietnam in the 50’s and 60’s, a very volatile country full of a variety of people speaking different dialects and practicing different religions. It is very important, then, that the government that is installed is one that is capable of maintaining some type of control or authority over its diverse people. On July 7, 1954, Ngo Dinh Diem came to power as the Prime Minister of South Vietnam (Fishel 107). Diem was backed by the United States as the best man for the job to prevent communism in South Vietnam. The problem is that while â€Å"every foreign power to intervene in Vietnam eventually attempted to install some group of Vietnamese figures to prevent a Communist victory,† many of them failed to consider that by installing a government that continued to exploit and alienate its people, they were driving the population more toward Communism because at least it seemed to be a government for the people (Gettleman 134). Likewise, the U.S. was concerned with its own interest and unfortunately overlooked the interests of the Vietnamese. In the first five or six years of Diem’s reign, the United States was quite pleased with its choice of Diem. Proponents of Diem praised him as an advocate of human rights who worked to uphold a democracy. Others who were not quite as flagrant in their approval simply stated that he was the best man among the limited choices being that he was strongly anti-communist. Many, includin... ...enerals who don’t even command a company. He lives in an ivory tower surrounded by his family† (Behind 150). Diem was also said to have given the Catholic regugees â€Å"preferential treatment in land redistribution, relief and assistance, commercial and export-import licenses, government employment, and other GVN largess† (Buddhist 217). The U.S. constantly pressured Diem to issue land reform in order to win some support from the peasants because, as his American advisors recognized â€Å"an exploited and impoverished peasantry provides fertile soil for communism, as in China; therefore, intelligent land reform, preserving private property and simultaneously creating a new middle class of farmers, is a necessity for ‘free world’ objectives† (Behind 142). This idea plays into the aforementioned assertion that America focused too heavily on their own interests (

Carrots Essay

Carrots is a root vegetable that originated in Afghanistan over 5000 years ago for there seeds and leaves. But today carrots are enjoyed for their fresh delicious flavours coming in all shapes and sizes in a variation of different colours like orange, red, yellow, purple, and white. Carrots can be purchased in all kinds of forms shredded, baby carrot, diced, sliced, regular size with leaf on or leaf off. Carrots can be stored in the fridge for up to 3 months but to prevent spoilage remove green leaves because the leaves draw moisture from the root causing carrots to dry out. Also carrots should be stored away from apples because they give off ethylene gas which causes carrots to become bitter. Purchasing carrots from the grocery store should be dried off if they are wet and tightly sealed in a plastic bag, what this does is it increases the nutrition value. Carrots contain B-carotene (a source of vitamin A), also it has fibres, anti-oxidants, minerals, calcium, potassium, magnesium, vitamins C,K and B6, also carrots helps improve eye sight, skin nourishment, hair growth, and reduces the risk of heart disease, and cancer. Carrots have many alternative ways they can be used like chopped for mirepoix, blended for drinks, boiled for soups & stews, fried for stir fry, steamed for side dishes, gratered for carrot cake, beauty remedies for hair & skin, or simply eaten raw. There are many recipes for carrots like carrot cake, glazed carrots, or ginger carrot soup. References www. carrotmuseum. com. uk www. foodnetwork. com / www. marthastewart. com (recipes)